mark sinclair (2003-01-25 07:14:23): Would anyone happen to know where I might find a passage where Heidegger explicitly argues that the idea of substantia is itself ambiguous in the sense that it can mean a thing and the being of the thing.
Heidegger does say this explicitly 
somewhere in the texts of the 1920s, but I can't find it at present.
It would not seem to be in any of the obvious places, such as the genealogy of existence and essence in GA24.
Any ideas anyone? Your help would be much appreciated.
Peter Danenberg (2003-01-26 06:40:04): Are you looking for substantia in particular, as used by, say, Aquinas, or would Aristotelean ὕλη (hule) also suffice?
Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1927) comes to mind, but I'll take a closer look.
Best,
Peter
Peter Danenberg (2003-01-26 06:58:02): Looks like you had already beat me to it 
; I might have looked in particular at § 10. c. "der Unterschied zwischen essentia und existentia in der Scholastik" and maybe § 11. "Phänomenologische Klärung"; but he appears indeed to skirt around the issue of substantia almost entirely, mentioning only in passing, for instance,
Es ist kein Zufall, daß Kant, bei dem noch die Begriffe von From und Materie, μοÏ?φή [morphe] und ὕλη [hule], erkenntnistheoretisch eine fundamentale Rolle spielen [...] etc. (S. 150)Do let us know if you come across anything.
pedestrian (2003-01-26 10:18:05): Here's something I stumbled accross this morning:
What underlies and has been placed under (subiectum) takes over the role of the ground upon which other things are placed so that what has been placed under can also be conceived as what stands under, and thus is constant before everything. Subiectum and substans mean the same thing: what is truly constant and real, what suffices for reality and constancy and is therefore called substantia. Soon the essence of hypokeimenon determined at the beginning, of what lies present of itself, is interpreted from the perspective of substantia. Ousia, presence, is thought as substantia. The concept of substance is un-Greek, but it dominates together with actualitas the essential character of Being in the metaphysics to follow.
"Metaphysics as History of Being", (p.27). The End of Philosophy, tr. J. Stambaugh.
mark sinclair (2003-01-26 15:27:05): Thanks for your time Peter. And thanks to Mr/Mrs Pedestrian.
In response to your first message Peter, the question concerns the Latinate substantia.
Unless I'm mistaken, there is a passage in one of the texts of the 1920s where Heidegger simply and explicitly (and the emphasis is on explicitly) argues that the idea of substantia is ambiguous, i.e. it is ontic - the 'core' of things, a thing upon which sits its attributes - as well as being ontological.
Of course, 'Die Metaphysik als Geschichte des Seins' goes in this direction, but the specific passage that I'm after lies elsewhere, in a text of the 1920s, I think.
Cheers.
pedestrian (2003-01-26 22:17:58): M.S.: And thanks to Mr/Mrs Pedestrian.
No sweat.
Here's a bonus quote. Kind of shooting in the dark, but here 'goes:
Even where the issue is not only one of ontical experience but also one of ontological understanding, the interpretation of Being takes its orientation in the first instance from the Being of entities within-the-world. Thereby the Being of what is proximally ready-to-hand gets passed over, and entities are first conceived as a context of Things (res) which are present-at-hand. "Being" acquires the meaning of "Reality". Substantiality becomes the basic characteristic of Being. Corresponding to this way in which the understanding of Being has been diverted, even the ontological understanding of Being moves into this horizon of this conception of Being. Like any other entity, Dasein too is present-at-hand as Real. In this way "Being in general" acquires the meaning of "Reality".
Being and Time, sect. 43.
O.k. I tried 
BTW: I'm not running at the moment. I have a new plate in my leg.
mark sinclair (2003-01-27 03:21:11): Thanks for your index work, Mr.P. I sense you are getting marginally warmer, jogging even.
Yes, the question might seem banal but a historical (nb.) treatment of the idea of substantia wherein Heidegger simply and literally describes the ontological difference inherent in it and thus the more or less (this is the problem) unmastered depth, if you will, of the original Latinate problematic, is specifically what I'm looking for.
Perhaps, the specificity of the question is clearer if I say that I'm trying to get to the bottom of Heidegger's differing responses to the question of the difference between hupokeimenon/subiectum & substantia.
Cheers